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Abstract: 
 
Regionally-based processes of political and economic integration, security cooperation, 
and even social identification have become increasingly important and prominent parts of 
the international system. Nowhere have such processes gone further than in Western 
Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, similar patterns of regional integration have been 
steadily developing in East Asia – a region many observers consider unlikely to replicate 
the European experience. What are the factors that encourage regional political 
cooperation and economic integration? Are there common forces encouraging such 
outcomes in very different geographical areas and at very different moments in history? 
This paper uses an historically grounded comparative approach to examine the historical 
pre-conditions that underpinned the formation of the European Union, and then contrasts 
them with the situation in East Asia today. While the overall geopolitical and specific 
national contexts are very different, the East Asian experience may ultimately generate 
relationships and structures that are more like the European Union’s than some of the 
sceptics imagine. 
 
 
One of the most widely noted and counter-intuitive features of the contemporary 
‘global’ era is that it has a distinctly regional flavour. While it is true that some of the 
globalisation literature has been over-heated and over-generalised, the persistence - if 
not the intensification -  of regional processes is still striking and somewhat 
surprising. Whether it is measured by trade and investment flows, political 
cooperation, or even the development of regionally based security communities, it is 
clear that regionally-based interactions are central components of the international 
order at the start of the twenty-first century. 
 
While there is now a substantial and growing literature on regionalism (see, Mansfield 
and Milner 1999), this generally focuses exclusively on the ‘new’ variety, which 
gathered pace in the aftermath of the Cold War’s end, and which  is primarily 
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associated with increased economic integration. Less attention has been given to the 
origins of regional processes, either in the most recent wave of regional development, 
or in the earlier period of regional integration, which is associated primarily with the 
emergence of European Union (EU). It is the central contention of this paper that we 
can learn something about both phases of regional development by placing them in 
comparative historical perspective. This sort of historically grounded analysis reveals 
some interesting parallels between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ regionalisms, as well as some 
noteworthy differences. While much of the impetus for regional initiatives comes, 
unsurprisingly, from regional actors, it is striking how influential extra-regional geo-
political forces have been in shaping regional processes – even where they were not 
consciously intended to be so. A comparative analysis of the early post-war initiatives 
that paved the way for the EU in Western Europe on the one hand,  and the recent 
emergence of ASEAN+3 in East Asia on the other, suggests that, although the origins 
of regionalism may be complex and their ultimate outcomes unpredictable, much 
depends on the dynamic interplay of regional and extra-regional influences. In other 
words, regionalism is not simply a contingent, functional response to the ‘needs’ of 
international capital, but an essentially political process informed by multidimensional 
economic and strategic factors. 
 
The paper is organised in the following way. First, I outline some of the more 
influential ways of conceptualising regionalism. Such an analysis highlights key 
differences between the old and new versions of regional theorisation and activity, as 
well as the different dynamics that drive economic, political and strategic interactions 
at the regional level. Second, I revisit the early post-war origins of what has now 
become the highly developed institutional structure of the EU. What is striking here is 
not simply that the EU’s present form was unimaginable in that early period, but that 
the driving force for such an initiative came primarily from outside Western Europe, 
and was a consequence of both the Cold War generally and American foreign policy 
in particular. In East Asia by contrast, which I consider in the third section, although 
American hegemony and the wider geo-political setting are still crucial influences on 
regional processes, they are having an inadvertent rather  than intentional impact. 
Whereas the EU sprang directly from a – highly successful – attempt to reconstitute 
Western Europe on a new integrated basis, in East Asia American foreign policy is 
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having a more ambivalent impact on a region that is gradually moving to assume 
greater autonomy, despite rather than because of American policy.  
 
 
Re-thinking regionalism: Theoretical perspectives 
 
At the outset it is important to be clear about what regionalism is, and about when it 
started to become an important feature of international relations. The latter point is 
more difficult to answer than it might appear, for even the most cursory glance at the 
historical record suggests that the emergence of the earliest political communities, 
trade relations and empires had strong regional biases (Buzan and Little 2000). It 
could hardly be otherwise; for most of human history technology was insufficiently 
developed to allow anything else. One of the reasons that regional processes have 
attracted such interest of late, and one of the qualities that distinguishes them from 
simply the unplanned interactions born of sheer propinquity, is that there is a degree 
of intentionality about contemporary processes that sets them apart from most earlier 
forms. Consequently, much recent scholarship about regional processes makes a basic 
distinction between regionalism and regionalization. In this formulation regionalism 
refers to the political process in which states drive cooperative initiatives. 
Regionalization, by contrast, refers to processes of economic integration which, while 
they may be influenced by state policies, are essentially the uncoordinated 
consequence of private sector activities (Breslin and Higgott 2000). 
 
Although the first wave of regionalism is generally associated with the emergence of 
the EU in the aftermath of the Second World War, attempts to impose regionally-
based political orders and trade relations were made by both Nazi Germany and Japan 
either before or during the war (Beasley 1987; Eichengreen and Frankel 1995). A 
number of points are worth noting about these earlier episodes: first, they were both 
driven by a combination of economic and strategic concerns; second, the  United 
States played a pivotal role in both ending these abortive regional adventures and in 
creating the new orders that replaced them; third, the war itself paved the way for new 
patterns of international relations in which Europe would be a region amongst 
regions, rather than the centre of world order (Fawcett 1995: 12). The final point that 
these earlier episodes highlight is the difference between ‘malign’ and ‘benign’ forms 
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of regionalism. In the case of  both Germany and Japan, each power attempted to 
impose a malign form of bilaterally-based, discriminatory trade and finance 
agreements on weaker countries that were designed to benefit the dominant power 
(Wyatt-Walter 1995: 78-79). The parallels with contemporary American policy, 
which has an increasingly bilateral flavour in the economic sphere (Ravenhill 2003), 
are both striking and at odds with the idea of a benign form of regionalism that is not 
supposed to discriminate against outsiders. 
 
Thinking about regions at a general theoretical level, especially in the aftermath of the 
first wave of Western European integration in the 1950s and 1960s, took on a 
decidedly ‘functionalist’ tenor (Hass 1964, 1958; Deutsch 1969). As a theoretical 
orientation, functionalist explanations have always been preoccupied with explaining 
how regional processes work and the benefits that flow from  their capacity to 
generate ‘spillovers’; they are less good at explaining the creation of regional orders 
in the first place (Hurrell 1995). While expectations about the inevitable 
intensification of regional processes and the development of new political 
communities that might pool sovereignty to promote greater economic integration and 
efficiency may have been overly optimistic, technocratic and insufficiently alert to the 
inherent political difficulties of such processes, the idea that regional integration is a 
necessary component of economic development has not gone away (see, for example, 
Vayrynen 2003). On the contrary, there is still a belief that the global integration of 
production processes means that firms will ‘increasingly demand, and states will be 
more willing to supply, regional trade arrangements’ (Milner 1997 : 79, emphasis in 
original). Indeed, some observers go further and suggest that regionalisation is in fact 
a response to globalisation (Oman 1994: 12-13). In this formulation, globalisation 
refers primarily to the growth of the financial sector, money markets and the 
transnational restructuring of production, and regionalization to those political 
initiatives that are intended to competitively advantage entire regions in response to it. 
The general claim is that economic competitive pressures are best mediated and 
accommodated through regional mechanisms. 
 
While this may help to account for some of the economic dynamics that underpinned 
the second wave of regional integration, which occurred in the context of 
simultaneous processes associated with globalisation, it neglects other factors that 
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have influenced regionalism in both East Asia and Europe. As Breslin and Higgott 
(2000: 335) perceptively point out, one of the glaring omissions of  the first wave of 
theorisation about regions was its failure to take the ‘idea of region’ seriously. In 
other words, inadequate attention was paid to the way regional identity was conceived 
and promoted, either internally, or in opposition to some notional ‘other’. This is a 
potentially significant issue, because one of the things that has distinguished the EU, 
particularly when compared to East Asia, is a more highly developed sense of 
regional identity. The ability to translate a nascent sense of regional identity into a 
more developed sense of ‘regioness’, in which ‘a geographical area is transformed 
from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational 
interests of the emerging region’ (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000: 461), is a  critical 
measure of regional development. It is manifest in the shift toward more formal, de 
jure forms of regionalism, as opposed to de facto forms of regionalization in which 
such potentialities have yet to gain formal political expression. While the EU is 
plainly the key historical exemplar of this possible transformation, it is important to 
remember that there was never anything ‘natural’ or inevitable about this and, as we 
shall see, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, nothing could have 
seemed less likely. 
 
Although we should not assume that the European experience is either the only 
possible route to greater regioness, or the definitive end point against which all others 
should be judged, there is something revealing and of potentially  wider comparative 
significance about the strategic context within which early European integration took 
place. One of the most striking aspects of the Cold War period generally  in Western 
Europe, and of the role and emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) in particular, was the manner in which a distinctive security discourse 
effectively unified allies in response to a perceived Soviet threat (Klein 1990;  see 
also, Waever 1996). While it has become increasingly commonplace to emphasise the 
socially constructed nature of security threats (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998), 
and while there is clearly a link between the increased regionalization of security 
issues and the ending of the Cold War in particular (Buzan and Waever 2003; Lake 
and Morgan 1997), it is important to remember that the deepening of economic and 
strategic ties in Western Europe had its genesis in the immediate aftermath of the war, 
and was a consequence of contingent geo-political forces, rather than the inevitable 
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structural logic of the bipolar system. In other words, security concerns were being 
placed on a regional footing and encouraging a concomitant sense of regional identity 
long before the end of the Cold War. Indeed, this was a self-consciously pursued part 
of the American-led creation of the post-war European order. The contrast with post-
war East Asia is a stark reminder of just how differently  regional security 
architectures can develop when the hegemonic power of the day adopts a different 
approach and creates a bilaterally-based security architecture, rather than one which 
encourages greater regional multilateralism and self-reliance (Hemmer and 
Katzenstein 2002). 
 
While the attention being paid to the regional level of analysis is welcome, we need to 
remember that such processes occur in a wider context. On the one hand this means 
that the long term, primarily economic, processes associated with globalisation are 
integrating formally discrete national economies in new ways that transcend national 
borders, but which continue to have strong regional biases. Nation states can respond 
proactively to such pressures, and regional cooperative strategies are one important 
potential element of such accommodations. Such insights have dominated the study of 
regional integration, particularly during the 1990s,  when it seemed that geo-
economics had permanently trumped geopolitics on the agendas of policymakers 
everywhere (Luttwak 1998). Recent events and the renewed preoccupation with 
security have not simply altered the calculus of national policy making priorities, but 
they have also forced a re-think of the way regional integrative processes may be 
occurring as a consequence. Plainly, the heightened concern with security and the new 
strategic relationships it is generating will affect the trajectory of regional 
development in unpredictable ways. One of the few historical parallels available is the 
period in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, when a similarly fluid 
geopolitical and strategic environment forced policymakers to recalibrate their 
thinking about international and regional relations. While the parallels may not be 
precise, and although the underlying structural conditions may have changed in 
important ways, the importance of strategic issues, the role played by the US in both 
periods, and it capacity to influence the course of regional integration and identity 
building provide some illuminating points of comparison. 
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The Origins of European Regionalism 
 
The EU has become such a taken-for-granted part of the international scene it is easy 
to forget that in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War the idea that a 
united, prosperous group of capitalist democracies might come to dominate Western 
Europe seemed unimaginable. That former foes Germany and France might form the 
central pillars of such an organisation would have appeared an even more remote 
prospect. And yet, despite occasional disagreements about the pace and direction of 
development, the undoubted success of the European project, and the deeply 
institutionalised nature of the relationships between its members, have made the EU 
by far the most integrated of regional arrangements. While the consolidation and 
institutionalisation of the EU may have gathered a momentum of its own and become 
a self-sustaining European process (Wallace 1995), it was not always thus. 
Paradoxically, the origins of European integration can be found in profoundly 
unpropitious economic and political circumstances, and a strategic environment that 
threatened further destruction, rather than the unparalleled period of economic 
expansion and political cooperation that actually eventuated. The critical factor that 
enabled much of Western Europe to overcome these unpromising circumstances was 
a newly ascendant America determined to ensure that ‘potential adversaries must 
never again be allowed to gain control of the resources of Eurasia through autarkical 
economic practices, political subversion, and/or military aggression’ (Leffler 1992: 
23). In short, geopolitical imperatives, rather than economic dynamics provided the 
critical initial impetus for European regionalism. 
 
During the ‘crisis of 1947’ the very survival of a number of European countries as 
independent liberal-capitalist entities seemed in doubt as Europe’s devastated 
economies and infrastructure struggled to cope with  the aftermath of war (Milward 
1984). It is worth remembering that at this time the Soviet Union was not just a 
formidable economic and strategic competitor, but a significant ideological rival. The 
interwar period had been marked by an almost terminal crisis of capitalism that 
culminated in the Second World War; the renaissance and ultimate triumph of 
capitalism as the dominant form of global political and economic organisation was far 
from assured. Socialism was a credible and attractive alternative to a market order that 
seemed inescapably prone to crisis. It was against this backdrop of economic crisis 
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and ideological rivalry that the Americans instituted the Marshall Plan. While the 
immediate goal of the Marshall Plan was to provide a direct boost to Europe’s ailing 
economies, in the eyes of its architects it was seen as ‘the key to social harmony, to 
the survival of private-enterprise capitalism, and to the preservation of political 
democracy’ (Hogan 1987: 428). Crucially, and in sharp contradistinction to the 
prevailing neoliberal ideology that is promoted under US auspices in present day East 
Asia, the American approach to Western European reconstruction was one that was 
based on America’s own highly successful experience of planned economic 
development during the New Deal (Burley 1993) – ideas that were subsequently 
projected onto the international system and which became significant components of 
the original Bretton Woods agreements (Latham 1997). 
 
Thus, the significance and desirability of European economic integration and 
development cannot be understood in isolation from the US’s overarching geopolitical 
goals and imperatives. As Gaddis (1982) points out, European economic 
reconstruction was a key part of the wider strategy of containment and the goal of 
establishing countervailing centres of power around the world - outposts of liberal 
capitalism that  might stand as bulwarks against Soviet expansionism. Whether one 
accepts Gaddis’(1997: 38) further claim that ‘the American empire’ emerged as a 
consequence of this sort of external pull rather than an internal push is more 
debateable, but what is clear is that the US’s prominent role in the economic and 
strategic affairs of post-war  western Europe was to a significant degree an ‘empire by 
invitation’ (Lundestad 1986). The comparative significance of this is not simply the 
obvious material benefit that accrued to the Europeans as a consequence of their 
increasingly close alignment with the US, but that such an initiative generally enjoyed 
the strong support of the national  populations involved. Significantly, of course, the 
devastating impact of the war had brought about significant political and social 
change within Europe, making such a realignment more feasible and attractive as 
class-based opposition to American hegemony was substantially weakened (Maier 
1981). As we shall see, not only have crises in Asia been of a significantly less 
traumatic order, but they have not worked anything as fundamental a transformation 
in underlying class relations and social values. Indeed, where crisis does seem to have 
had an impact is in reinforcing rather reducing tensions with the US. 
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The most decisive impact of American influence in the longer term was  not simply to 
prop up the European economies and make them bulwarks against Soviet 
expansionism, but to significantly influence the long-term development of the 
countries themselves. As Westad points out: 
 
…the US response to the “invitations” came to be shaped – not as a rescue operation for 
besieged (and to a great extent discredited) political leaderships but as a conscious and 
comprehensive attempts at changing Europe (and Japan) in the direction of US ideals 
and models…This,  perhaps, was the real revolution of the Cold War period: that the 
United States over a period of fifty years transformed its main capitalist competitors 
according to its own image (Westad 2000: 555). 
 
Given the extensive literature that discusses varieties of capitalism and the persistence 
of difference in forms of economic organisation (Coates 2000),  there is plainly a 
debate to be had about how complete the process of structural transformation actually 
was – especially in East Asia. Nevertheless, it is clear that in both Europe and East 
Asia, while American policy may have been preoccupied with the security issues, and 
although America’s domestic politics and the nature of the American state itself may 
have come to reflect such preoccupations at the height of the Cold War (Hogan 1998), 
there was always a fundamental desire to ensure ‘that the world be made safe and 
assessable for the American economic system’ (LaFeber 1999: 284). In other words, 
there has always been an intention to pursue simultaneous strategic and economic 
objectives. The distinctive feature of the post-war reconstruction period as far as 
American planners were concerned, was that it offered ‘a way to reconcile ostensibly 
incompatible economic and security imperatives’ (Hogan 1988: 291). This goal is an 
increasingly explicit part of contemporary American policy, too. As we shall see, 
however, the unification of East Asia is not the intended outcome. American power 
may be a critical influence, but its precise impact is uncertain and dependent on 
contingent historical circumstances. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, even at the outset of  post-war European reconstruction, when 
it might be supposed that the exhausted European powers would be especially 
amenable to American initiatives,  it is important to acknowledge that both French 
and British diplomatic efforts were crucial in shaping post-war outcomes. In the 
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strategic sphere the British played a decisive role in promoting the idea of a pan-
European security organisation in the face of ‘considerable American reluctance’ 
(Folly 1984: 60). Likewise the French were the driving force behind the development 
of the European Coal and Steel Community that paved the way for a deeper process 
of European integration and the rehabilitation of Germany (Lovett 1996).  Having 
said that, the resolution of the ‘German problem’ and its acceptance as a central part 
of both Europe’s nascent economic and strategic architecture was made easier 
because of American participation (Stirk 1996: 108). Indeed, in many ways America’s 
strategic and political leverage was actually of greater significance than its direct 
economic assistance. Despite the praise heaped upon  the Marshall Plan as an example 
of what looks like – especially when compared to contemporary policies – an example 
of selfless and far-sighted diplomacy (Kunz 1997), the scale of direct economic 
assistance was actually fairly modest, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of 
the income of the recipient countries (Milward 1984: ch. 3). Similarly, it is important 
to emphasise that initiatives like the European Coal and Steel Community were not 
simply technocratic initiatives designed to coordinate steel output in Western Europe; 
on the contrary, the principal purpose of ‘economic’ projects like the Schumann Plan 
which provided a blueprint for post-war European integration was to provide a 
political framework to bind together former foes and ensure Germany’s peaceful 
integration at the heart of Europe (Trachtenberg 1999). 
 
Thus, the general points to emphasise about this period are that firstly, the foundations 
of European integration are to be found in the rather mundane, technocratic and 
unpropitious-looking negations for post-war economic reconstruction and integration. 
Although the political ambitions and development of the EU may have expanded 
dramatically over the ensuing years (Milward 2000), its origins, and the critically 
important capacity to bind France and Germany together as the central pillars of the 
nascent organisation, may be found in economic initiatives that seemed unremarkable 
at the time. It is also important to recognise, as Milward (1984: 492) reminds us, that 
Europeans pursuit of their perceived national interests was a major force in paving the 
way for European integration (see, also Moravcsik 1998). In other words, European 
integration was not simply an externally imposed project over which Europeans had 
no influence, but neither were its principal architects necessarily as ‘visionary’ about 
the long-term implications and prospects of European cooperation as might seem the 
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case in retrospect. The second point to make is that while the US’s economic 
assistance was clearly important and far-sighted, its political and strategic role was 
arguably more decisive in pushing Europe’s own political integration,  underpinning 
the new security architecture that came to dominate Western Europe, and ultimately 
in helping to bring about the long-term redefinition of  European identities in ways 
that would have been unimaginable immediately after the war (see, Marcussen et al. 
1999).  
 
The world in which European integration had its origins is plainly a very different 
place from today’s. Although there is currently  a good deal of debate about the nature 
and durability of American hegemony (see, for example, Bacevich 2002; Kupchan 
2002), especially in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq, the US has been the world’s 
dominant power for more than half a century. At the dawn of European integration, 
however, not only was European development a work in progress, but so was the 
construction of the wider geopolitical order of which it was a part. American views 
about the new world order it hoped to create were profoundly influenced by the 
perceived need to contain the Soviet Union; Western Europe was seen as a pivotal 
arena in which this Manichean struggle would be played out (Harper 1994). 
Economic integration in Western Europe was central to this project, something that 
was facilitated by the creation of an array of new inter-governmental organisations 
designed to institutionalise a new liberal economic order (Latham 1997). 
Significantly, and in striking contrast to the experience of East Asia, however, 
American attitudes toward Western Europe were generally predicated on equality and 
respect, and the basis upon which the post-war order was to be created was 
multilateral (Pollard 1985). In East Asia, not only did the US not have the same high 
opinion of or respect for the Asian powers (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002), but they 
constructed a strategic and economic order that was predicated on a bilaterally-based 
‘hub and spokes’ model that made regional integration a remote prospect throughout 
the Cold War period (Joffe 1995). 
 
While it is important to acknowledge the role the Europeans themselves played in the 
process of post-war economic reconstruction and the subsequent course of deeper 
political integration, it is clear that American actions were crucial and stand in stark, 
revealing contrast to the East Asian experience. Perhaps European integration would 
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have happened anyway even without American assistance, but the early success in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, in which the US was a prominent player, gave vital 
momentum to collaborative efforts. In short, the supportive efforts of the US were a 
vital part of the earliest phase of European regional development. American power 
has also been important in East Asia, too, but East Asian regionalism has moved 
ahead despite rather than because of American efforts. To see why, and to begin the 
process of attempting to isolate the different forces that have made East Asian 
attempts at regional cooperation so difficult and belated, we need to place the Asian 
experience in its specific historical context. 
 
East Asia’s Belated Regionalism 
 
The most obvious comparative point about Europe and Asia is that  the 
institutionalisation of political cooperation (or regionalism) in East Asia has been 
much slower than in Western Europe. True, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967, is the most durable forum to 
emerge in the ‘developing world’, and has proved a to be an important vehicle with 
which the countries of Southeast Asia can manage and promote specific interests. But 
the development of a wider East Asian regional grouping which, in addition to the 
Southeast Asians,  included the major economies of Northeast Asia – China, Japan, 
and South Korea – did not gain any real momentum until the late 1990s. An informal 
summit meeting between ASEAN and the three regional heavyweights was convened 
until as late as 1997 as part of the regular ASEAN summit meetings. Meetings of the 
‘ASEAN + 3’ grouping as it became known were regularised from 1998 onwards. 
 
Why was regionalism in East Asia so much slower to begin than in Europe? The 
reasons are complex, but can be divided into the historical, the contingent and – above 
all, perhaps – the American. As noted above, American policy toward East Asia was 
(and is) very different than toward Western Europe. Not only did the US 
institutionalise a series of bilateral rather than multilateral relations across the region, 
but the Cold War divisions the US was instrumental in entrenching made any region-
wide cooperation impossible as a consequence. This is especially true of American 
attitudes toward China, where the sort of containment policy that characterised 
relations with the Soviet Union in Europe was applied to China – a policy position 
 13
which still has adherents in America’s foreign policy establishment (Papayoanou and 
Kastner 1999; Shambaugh 1996).Without China a genuine East Asian organisation 
that included the key countries of the region was meaningless. Indeed, the pivotal 
historical importance of China to the overall region is revealed by its capacity to 
shape political and strategic relations even when not directly participating in them: 
Cold War divisions generally and concerns about the strategic intentions of 
communist China have actually been critical catalysts for the limited regional 
integration that occurred within the Southeast Asian countries that has occurred thus 
far (Acharya 2001). It is testimony to the degree of ‘socialization’ that China’s 
leadership appears to have undergone since the opening up of the Chinese economy 
only three decades or so ago (Johnston 2003), combined with the growing importance 
to East Asia of the Chinese economy that attitudes toward China have changed 
substantially in the region (Ba 2003). 
 
But China’s problematic status has not been the only impediment to regional 
integration. Japan may have become the second largest economy in the world under 
the auspices of US hegemony, but it has been achieved at the cost of its own regional 
leadership ambitions. While Japan’s role as a potential regional leader may not have 
suffered from the crippling ideological constraints that thwarted China for so long, it 
had other, equally debilitating handicaps that effectively nullified its claims. The 
concentration on economic development and the desire to maintain a low diplomatic 
profile that have distinguished Japanese policy-making priorities have had predictable 
consequences. As Drifte (1996: 143) points out, ‘narrow economic interests, domestic 
political paralysis and concern about negative Asian reactions because of the 
country’s historical legacy prevent the Japanese government from taking an open 
leadership role even there, where it would look relatively natural and easy’. Certainly 
the legacy of the war, the notoriously impotent and self-absorbed nature of Japan’s 
political class (Curtis 1999), and bureaucratic rivalries between Japan’s powerful 
ministries help to account for Japan’s ineffectiveness, but is vital to recognise how 
subordinate Japan remains to the US. Since the Second World War ‘the bilateral 
relationship with the United States [has been] the indispensable core of Japan’s 
position in the world’ (Green 2001: 3), with the consequence foreign policy-making 
always occurs with at least one eye on it possible reception in the US. Only recently 
have Japanese political elites begun to display a degree of independence about policy 
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toward the region, something that has been driven both by the impact of recent 
American foreign policy, and by challenge presented by China’s increasingly skilful 
and effective push for regional leadership (Vatikiotis and Hiebert 2003; Breckon 
2002). 
 
In East Asia in the post-war period, therefore, unlike the earlier European experience, 
American power has primarily had a constraining rather than an enabling impact on 
processes of regionalism. Not only did American policy effectively fracture the 
putative region along ideological lines for around fifty years, but it directly (in 
China’s case) or indirectly (in Japan’s case) undermined the leadership potential and 
ambitions of the two most important powers in East Asia. What is equally noteworthy 
about the East Asian experience, which is also sharply at odds with the European 
precedent, is that East Asian regionalism ultimately moved ahead in spite, rather than 
because of American policy and attitudes . In this context, the East Asian financial 
crisis and the role played by the US has been the single most catalytic event in 
accelerating East Asian interest in and moves toward regionalism, although the ‘war 
on terror’ is also having the effect of further alienating a number of East Asian 
governments from the US.  
 
In the economic sphere, it is important to note that as recently as the mid-1990s - and 
before the region was gripped by economic crisis - Malaysia’s attempts to promote its 
own vision of regionalism under the banner of the East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC) met with little support (Hook 1999). Crucially, with the US expressing 
hostility to the initiative, Japan was unwilling to risk incurring American displeasure. 
However, the financial crisis that erupted toward the end of 1997 profoundly changed 
views amongst East Asia’s political and economic elites about the basis upon which 
national economies and the region as a whole were to be integrated into the wider 
international political economy (Terada 2003; Webber 2001).  
 
There is no intention here of adding to the voluminous literature on the crisis (see, for 
example, Haggard 2000), but it is important to highlight briefly its overall impact as a 
spur to regional cooperation. In the aftermath of the crisis, it became painfully clear 
that East Asia was vulnerable to powerful systemic forces like the mobile capital that 
caused such havoc when it fled the region, and to political pressure from the US and 
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the IFIs over which it exerts a powerful influence (Author). Such pressure was 
intended to exploit the crisis and  to impose the sort of neoliberal policy reform that 
had hitherto been studiously resisted by East Asia’s famously state-led economies.  
Not only was there widespread scepticism about the wisdom of financial sector 
liberalisation across much of the region as a result of the crisis, but there was 
increasing resentment about the role of the US in continuing to promote such reforms 
in the face of compelling evidence about their destructive role in the crisis (Wade 
2001). As a consequence, partly as a way of responding to American pressure, partly 
as an attempt to insulate the region from exogenous shocks, and partly as a result of a 
nascent, but growing sense of regional identity, the institutionalisation and 
formalisation of intra-regional processes and relationships has gathered pace (Acharya 
2003). The possibility that East Asia might have some underlying sources of identity 
is worth emphasising, as there is a widespread belief that Europe’s cultural heritage 
leaves it uniquely well-placed to promote regional cooperation. And yet, the Second 
World War a stark reminder of just what a myth the idea of European solidarity 
actually is. Moreover, it is important to recognise that not only is an interest in 
promoting ‘Asian’ identities fairly long-standing (Funabashi 1993), but that there are 
also a number of common historical experiences, particularly the frequently traumatic 
impact of ‘the west’, that provide a basis for cooperation and identification at the 
regional level (Stubbs 2002). 
 
While the scale of the crisis facing East Asia in the late 1990s was clearly of a 
different order to that which confronted Europe in the late 1940s, like the Europeans 
before them, the sorts of initiatives being undertaken in East Asia during the first 
phase of serious regionalism are superficially unremarkable and technocratic. The 
coordination of regional monetary policies to manage or ward off future potential 
crises may not seem like the visionary precursor of thoroughgoing regional 
cooperation, but neither did the foundation of the original European Coal and Steel 
Community. The comparative point to make about East Asia’s initial forays into 
region-wide cooperative arrangements is that they are not dependent on the 
Americans to provide the material resources to make them work, in the way the 
Europeans were. On the contrary, East Asia is already well positioned to be a 
powerful and independent economic actor (Dieter and Higgott 2003). Moreover, the 
relationship between the US on the one hand, and China and Japan on the other, is 
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fundamentally different form that which prevailed between the US and Europe after 
the war. While the consumer markets of North America remain vitally important for 
the export-oriented economies of East Asia, the US is equally reliant on continuing 
inflows of capital from China and Japan to finance its massive budget deficits, its 
ballooning levels of private indebtedness, and its low interest rate regime (Economist 
2004; Brenner 2002). The symbiotic dependency that has emerged between East Asia 
and the US is not simply different to the earlier US-Europe relationship, it potentially 
confers economic and political leverage on the East Asians. What is lacking at this 
stage is the political will to exploit such potential, and the institutional competence to 
act more independently as a region. 
 
A number of factors may help East Asians overcome their apparent inability to 
cooperate on a region-wide basis. First, ending of the Cold War (the existence of 
which was such a pivotal spur to European integration) has removed the single most 
important obstacle to regional integration in East Asia. The concomitant rehabilitation 
and growing economic importance of China has removed another critical impediment. 
Second, and of greatest comparative significance, American foreign policy is creating 
dilemmas for Asian policymakers that are fuelling a reassessment of the value of the 
US’s strategic presence in the region, the necessity of which was considered 
indispensable by some of the US’s key regional allies. That such a re-assessment 
might occur in parts of Southeast Asia with large Muslim populations, or troublesome 
insurrectionary groups is possibly unsurprising (Author), but that it should also be 
happening in South Korea and Japan is more remarkable and noteworthy (Scanlon 
2004; Curtin 2004). The country that stands to gain most from any realignment in the 
region is, of course, China. It is not necessary to completely accept David Kang’s 
provocative thesis, that intra-East Asian strategic relations may be reassuming a more 
‘traditional’, hierarchical order centred on China (Kang 2003), to recognise that 
security orders have a strong regional dimension, and that such a realignment is nether 
unprecedented nor unthinkable (Buzan and Waever 2003). If this hitherto 
insurmountable obstacle to greater regional security cooperation can be overcome, 
then the acceleration of economic integration would seem almost inevitable. Indeed, it 
is noteworthy that China has already assumed a central place as a driver of regional 
economic activity (Hale and Hale 2003), something that would seem to make greater 
East Asian regionalization and regionalism more likely than not. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
Regionalization may be primarily driven by the private sector and the consequences 
of the generally uncoordinated actions of firms, investors and markets, but 
regionalism, by contrast, doesn’t just happen. On the contrary, political cooperation 
requires a degree of purposefulness and coordination that sets it apart from either the 
sort of trans-border processes associated with globalisation, or from sheer geography. 
In both Europe and Asia, regionalism has been dependent on the activities of political 
actors to drive it forward, actions that have been significantly facilitated or inhibited 
by wider geopolitical circumstances. In Europe, the exigencies of war-time 
reconstruction and the emerging bi-polar confrontation with the Soviet Union gave a 
critical spur to regional cooperation. While this process was given extra impetus by 
the material assistance and – at times – the political leverage of the US, Europeans 
themselves played a key role in directing the course of regionalism, and ensuring that 
the Americans remained engaged in it.  
 
Things could hardly have been more different in East Asia. Not only was the Cold 
War a powerfully centrifugal rather than centripetal force in Asia, but even when the 
region was eventually freed from its paralysing influence, East Asian regionalism has 
gathered pace despite rather than because of American wishes. American power and 
pre-eminence in the post-war period inevitably matters, but it does not always have 
the impact that American policy-makers expect. In Europe, there was a residue of 
good will toward the Americans and strong desire in Western Europe to keep the US 
actively engaged in the economic and especially the strategic affairs of the region. 
American power in such circumstances facilitated and encouraged European regional 
initiatives. In East Asia, American power has either made regionalism difficult 
because of the essentially bilateral strategic architecture it has created or - until 
recently at least -  actively opposed regional initiatives that threaten to undercut its 
influence. Of late this opposition appears to be waning as the US becomes 
preoccupied with more pressing problems elsewhere, and because American 
policymakers judge there is little threat posed by the sorts of initiatives undertaken 
thus far (Hayashi forthcoming). And yet, regional cooperation in Asia continues to 
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gather pace, and the US presents a convenient ‘other’ against which a nascent sense of 
region-hood or greater regioness can be defined.  
 
None of this means that East Asia’s future is necessarily Western Europe’s past, or 
that the EU presents either the only, or even the most complete form of regionalism. 
What a comparison of regions demonstrates is that there are a number of different 
initial paths to regional integration that will be shaped by specific historical 
circumstances, and the particular patterns of political, economic and strategic 
interaction that dominate individual regions. Seen in this light we should not expect 
East Asia to replicate the European experience even if the formal institutions of 
regionalism continue to consolidate: the preoccupation with protecting national 
sovereignty that has distinguished ASEAN, and the absence of a highly developed 
array of civil society and private sector organisations of a sort that has characterised 
the EU’s distinctive patterns of governance, means that East Asia could not become 
Western Europe in the short term even if this was widely desired (Author).  
 
What a comparison of the origins of European and Asian regionalism suggests, then, 
is that regional processes can occur in a variety of circumstances, but that major crises 
are pivotal catalysts. Even though the idea that crises play a key role in reconfiguring 
existent patterns of political practices, economic structures and strategic relations is 
well established (Gourevitch 1986; Ikenberry 2001), it is not generally linked to 
processes of regionalism. Nor is the role of hegemonic power – in this case, the US – 
generally appreciated or well understood, but it has clearly been a major direct of 
indirect influence on the evolution of regional processes in both Asia and Europe 
(Author). Given that regionalism is plainly here to stay, and a defining feature of, and 
major response to, globalisation, the challenge for the future is to understand the 
complex interaction between the regional, the global, and the hegemonic. East Asia’s 
contemporary evolution and Western Europe’s historical experience suggests that 
while such processes are essentially unpredictable and contingent, we can at least 
identify the principal factors that are likely to shape regional outcomes in the future. 
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